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Peace through Constitutional 
Amendment? 
Opportunities and Tendencies
Andreas Mehler
On 9 July 2011 the validity of Sudan’s interim constitution will end and South Sudan 
will be independent as determined per referendum. For five years, the constitution has 
contributed to a significant decrease in violence between the government and South 
Sudanese rebels (while war has been rampaging in the province of Darfur).
Analysis
The events in South Sudan could be paradigmatic for the fact that opportunities for a 
policy of peace by means of constitutional amendments are often missed.
  Constitutional amendments offer an extensive range of possibilities for exerting 
influence on ethnically or otherwise divided societies. However, this potential is 
rarely put to use.
  The constitutional determination of the form of government, the main rules for 
decision-making and minority rights should be particularly binding for all former 
warring parties.
  Constitutional amendments and peace agreements in intra-state conflicts form a 
complex relationship to one another. Constitutional amendments do not always 
follow peace agreements. Peace processes and processes of constitutional reform 
are often long and multipartite.
  Between 2005 and 2010, there were only four countries (Burundi, Iraq, Nepal, Sudan) 
in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the MENA region with divided societies where a 
peace agreement and a significant constitutional amendment that affected the root 
causes of the conflict occurred.
  Nevertheless, other cases in which constitutional amendments are either a) used as 
prevention against conflicts or b) can be seen as lessons learned from long-lasting 
tensions (Bolivia, Ecuador, Kenya, Zanzibar/Tanzania) exist.
Keywords: constitutions, peace agreements, ethnicity, consociational democracy
- 2 -GIGA Focus International Edition 2/2011
Why Constitutional Engineering?
Constitutions are always an expression of their 
time and require periodic adjustments. The term 
constitutional engineering implies that “sophisticated 
craftsmanship” is being applied. Incorporating 
the key problems impeding the creation of so-
cietal order into constitutions and establishing 
fundamental rules for their regulation (whereas 
the fine adjustments are determined by laws and 
regulatory statutes) seems the obvious thing to 
do. This should specifically apply to issues that 
have proven to have a strong potential for causing 
conflicts, in particular for the coexistence of identity 
groups with divergent interests.
One of the factors frequently leading to violent 
domestic conflicts in ethnically divided societies 
is the perception that access to public goods (edu-
cation, health, infrastructure, security, etc.) is not 
equal, and civil rights and liberties do not seem 
to equally apply to everyone. Constitutions can 
provisionally grant fundamental rules for such mat-
ters (Brancati 2009). Constitutional amendments 
made as adjustments to new social compromises 
are most likely to be made in the wake of resolved 
violent escalations and peace agreements. In the 
recent past, peace agreements have particularly 
often been based on power-sharing arrangements. 
In some cases – but by no means in all – they have 
been included in the constitution (for example, 
in Bosnia, Burundi, Nepal, Northern Ireland and 
Sudan). The first question that arises is how often 
constitutional amendments reflect the contents of 
peace agreements.
The subsequent question is: Which seemingly 
conflict-relevant content is codified in amended 
constitutions? Even though the form in which 
individual civil rights and liberties (and their 
constitutional guarantee) are incorporated may 
be conflict-relevant, the central issues in “divided 
societies” are matters of representation, power-
sharing and the protection of identity groups, as 
well as the moderation of those groups’ demands.
The term “consociational democracy” (Arend 
Lijphart) is the usual reference point in the academic 
discussion of this topic. Lijphart (1977: 25 et seq.) 
emphasizes the following key elements:
1) a grand coalition formed by the political leaders 
of all significant groups of a plural society;
2) a mutual right to veto government decisions;
3) proportionality as the standard for political re-
presentation and for the staffing of state offices, 
as well as for the allocation of public funds; and 
4) a high degree of at least cultural autonomy for the 
constituent segments/principle of subsidiarity.
Although this principle is very influential in 
practice, it has often been criticized in academia. 
While Lijphart proposes the participation of ethnic 
minorities or other identity groups on the basis of 
their identity, the adherents of the “integrative” 
school of thought believe that precisely this is 
not conducive to achieving the intended aim 
(for example, Horowitz 1985; Reilly 2001), as 
consociational methods, they believe, initially 
provide more incentives for the advocation of ra-
dical group interests than for moderation. Thus the 
division of society cannot be revoked. Adherents 
of consociational democracy in turn argue that the 
acknowledgment and recognition of contrariness 
can, in the long term, defuse them. There are 
contrary approaches, ranging from “integration” 
to “recognition of diversity”, as to how conflicts 
in divided societies can be integrated into the 
institutions. A general determination as to which 
“institutional configuration” is conducive to the 
moderation of group interests cannot be made 
(Horowitz 2008: 1213). In many cases, the end 
result does not go beyond a selective adoption 
of conflict-reducing institutions, even though it 
is likely that nothing short of a comprehensive, 
logically coherent constitutional reform will actu-
ally yield the desired effects.
Institutional conflict-reduction will probably be 
most durable if it is protected by a constitution. The 
suitable term for this is constitutional engineering 
(Sartori 1994). In conflict theory, constitutional 
engineering implies a very high degree of quality. 
In this context, the “security dilemma” that rebels 
face is of particular relevance: when can they 
surrender their arms without placing themselves 
at risk of immediately being violently subdued 
by the state? A corresponding constitutional 
amendment represents a costly signal which goes 
beyond a “cheap” pact among the elites or a peace 
agreement (Jarstad/Nilsson 2008). It is therefore 
of obvious importance whether consociational-
democratic elements or integrative elements are 
codified in the constitution: former conflict parties 
can only expect recognition of their concerns and 
of their interest in mere survival if such regulations 
are included in the constitution (however, only 
the continuous application of the constitution will 
create reliability).
Even a superficial look reveals that by no means 
all peace processes that ended ethnic-regional 
conflicts or other violent conflicts caused by issues 
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of identity entail constitutional amendments. 
This observation also applies to cases where a 
particularly high degree of escalation had been 
reached. Burundi’s 2005 constitution is a clear 
and differentiated reflection of how constitutional 
engineering attempts to achieve conflict containment. 
In contrast, Liberia’s 2003 peace agreement had no 
immediate effects on the constitutional process. Is 
it possible that, as put forward by Waldner (2009), 
a causal link between institutional engineering and 
peace does not exist? First, we need to create a 
clearer empirical picture.
Constitutional Amendments in “Divided 
Societies”
This contribution of Focus asks whether and to 
what extent constitutional amendments made 
in ethnically or religiously divided societies in 
Africa, Asia, Latin America and in the Middle East 
in the period from 2005 to 2010 make reference 
to key causes of the conflicts. First, I will assign 
empirical data to the individual continents and 
examine whether states that reached important 
peace agreements in intra-state violent conflicts 
(!)1 made constitutional amendments that aimed to 
reduce conflict in the same period. In this context, 
whether a constitution was accepted before a 
peace agreement was reached (or vice versa) does 
not play a role, as both events could be the result 
of long negotiations.
The peace agreements included in the con-
stitution are a) cases coded as a “peace treaty” 
or as a “ceasefire with conflict regulation” by the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), b) 
(African) cases not coded by the UCDP2 but where 
we know from our own research that important 
peace agreements occurred in said period, and c) 
additions to the UCDP database with cases that 
occurred worldwide in 2010 – the UCDP database 
covers the period up to the end of 2009.
• For a), the UCDP lists the following cases: Bu rundi 
2006 and 2008, Indonesia (Aceh 2005), Nepal 2006, 
Niger 2008, Central African Republic 2008.3
1 Based on the UCDP’s Conflict Termination Dataset, 2010–
11, 1946–2009 (cf. Kreutz 2010). The UCDP differentiates 
between extra-state, intra-state and inter-state warfare.
2 In part this is due to the threshold values selected by 
the UCDP. The list in Mehler 2009 is the basis for the 
categorization of additional peace agreements in Africa.
3 The coding of the agreement between Israel and Hezbollah 
for ending the conflict in southern Lebanon as “intra-state” 
in 2006 may be misleading or false. This article does not deal 
with North America, Europe and the states that emerged 
from the former Soviet Union.
• For b), the following additional cases belong to 
the same basic statistical unit: Côte d’Ivoire 2007, 
DR Congo 2009, Iraq 2007, Mali 2006, Sudan 
2005, Chad 2006/2007.
• For c), important peace agreements were reached 
in Ethiopia (Ogaden) and Sudan (Darfur) as well 
as in Yemen.
Second, I will provide exemplary examinations 
of other, more recent constitutional amendments 
in “divided societies”4 that took place in 2005 and 
show indications that constitutional engineering was 
used as an instrument of conflict management. 
Preventive and reactive actions seem to be of 
equal importance.
Africa
Since 2005 important peace agreements have been 
reached in the following states:5 Burundi, Côte 
d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Chad and 
the Central African Republic. Surprisingly, Côte 
d’Ivoire is not listed in the Minorities at Risk Project, 
although it is clearly a state with a “divided society”. 
The bloody political crises in Kenya, Madagascar 
and Zimbabwe (each occurred in 2008 with im-
portant pacts among the elites) are not formally 
classified as wars by the UCDP. Nevertheless, 
these three cases display great resemblance with 
above-mentioned cases insofar as the conflict was 
resolved by implementing externally brokered 
power-sharing arrangements. In the case of Kenya, 
the 2010 constitutional amendment was definitely 
of fundamental importance.6
In the same period, important constitutional 
amendments7 were made in the following countries 
4 All states referred to here as “divided societies” are coded in 
the Minorities at Risk Project of the University of Maryland. 
Two hundred eighty-three groups are listed there; each has 
to have at least 500,000 members, an arbitrary figure. Not all 
counted groups make immediate sense (e.g. “Westerners” 
in Cameroon, Jews in Argentina). The Arab world has 29 
groups (Africa 75; Asia 57; Latin America 33). Nepal and 
Côte d’Ivoire (cf. below) are not listed. 
5 Here, conflicts with a sustained ending (at least one year 
without any significant violent acts between the former 
warring parties) constitute important peace agreements.
6 The main reason for constitutional amendment in 
Madagascar in 2010 was to give the (too) young insurgent 
Andry Rajoelina the right to run for president. In Zimbabwe, 
constitutional discussions are ongoing. However, they only 
peripherally pertain to rights of groups in a divided society.
7 In agreement with Widner (2008: 1521), constitutional amend-
ments are rated important if they contain new provisions 
with regard to participation and the contestation of a 
regime (changes to a multiparty system, civil and political 
liberties), ownership rights, regional or ethnic autonomy, 
as well as significant changes concerning the allocation of 
competencies to the various state branches.
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(according to the Minorities at Risk Project, not 
all of them belong to the states being considered 
here): Angola, Burundi, the DR Congo, Djibouti, 
Cameroon, Kenya, Comoros, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Niger, Rwanda, Mozambique, Mauritania, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Chad, Uganda, the Central African 
Republic and Zimbabwe. In few of these cases, 
institutional change was used for the purpose 
of conflict reduction; rather, the most important 
motives were the retention, extension or limitation 
of power.8 These ambitions can also indirectly be 
relevant for the conflict, but they do not affect the 
group interests that this text focuses on. In the 
following, I will look at the individual examples.
Burundi’s extensive peace process generated 
a constitution that was accepted per referendum 
in 2005 prior to the signing of separate peace 
agreements by both rebel movements, the CNDD-
FDD and the FNL. The constitution, it is safe to 
say, was a prerequisite for the surrendering of 
arms. In the period under examination here, 
Burundi’s constitution represents one of the most 
strongly differentiated texts for the containment 
of conflicts with ethnic connotations: a grand 
coalition with two vice-presidents from different 
ethnic and party-political backgrounds (each 
representing the dominant ethnic group in their 
party; Article 124); a government consisting of 
60% Hutu and 40% Tutsi ministers (Article 129); 
the same applies to the administration and the 
parliament (Articles 43, 164); laws require a two-
thirds majority to pass (Article 175, i.e. with 
Tutsi votes); 50:50 composition of the security 
forces (Article 257); senate representation of each 
province by one Hutu senator and one Tutsi 
senator (Article 180); a detailed regulation of local 
government.
Burundi’s constitution was largely based on 
the consociational model. However, the small 
country lacks one important prerequisite for a 
consociational democracy: ethnically delineated 
settlement areas, which would permit federalism 
or other forms of decentralisation as an expression 
of group autonomy (cf. Stroh 2010 on Rwanda). 
The “Burundi model” was under pressure due 
to the nevertheless monopolizing tendencies in 
the 2010 election and the subsequent opposition 
boycott.
8 Djibouti’s (2010) most important constitutional amendments 
also served to facilitate a further tenure of the president. 
Nevertheless, a senate was introduced as a second chamber, 
which supplements decentralization and in turn played an 
important role in the peace treaty of 2002. 
This is different in the case of the “comprehensive 
peace agreement” reached in Sudan in 2005 as a 
culmination of a long negotiation process between 
the two conflicting parties: the SPLA/SPLM and 
the government. The interim constitution contains 
practically all elements of a consociational democ-
racy: wide-ranging autonomy of South Sudan/
high degree of decentralization (Articles 25–26); 
recognition of cultural autonomy of minorities 
(Article 47); principle of consensus between the 
president and vice-president in decision-making 
processes (Article 51, 2); the first vice-president is 
from South Sudan (Article 62, 1); agreement of a 
grand coalition on the national level (Article 80); 
wealth-sharing (Article 185), including regulations 
for oil revenues (Articles 190–192).
The agreement was made between both parties 
at the expense of others and constituted one of the 
central problems: neither South Sudanese mino-
rities nor groups of other regions were included 
in the distribution of power. This approach has 
reached its limits with the foreseeable separation 
of the country in July 2011.
In Kenya, the introduction of the constitutional 
amendment per referendum occurred in 2010 
following long discussions and the successful 
conclusion of the 2008 post-electoral crisis. 
Several new dispositions aim to improve the 
representation of minority rights (establishment 
of a second chamber pursuant to Articles 96 and 98) 
and group autonomy. The nine provinces under 
central administration will be succeeded by 47 
county councils with an elected executive branch 
and limited legislative powers (Articles 176–187). 
The Kadhi courts for civil cases between Muslims 
(Article 170; based on the Sharia) will strengthen 
group autonomy. The new regulations for land 
reform (Articles 60–68), which are to be supervised 
by an independent commission (Article 67), 
aiming at the tense situation in the Rift Valley, 
will probably prove to be conflict-relevant. The 
pact among the elites for solving the 2008 crisis 
did not result in the distribution of power being 
constitutionally institutionalized in the form of a 
grand coalition.
Usually, constitutional amendments in other 
ethnically divided African states without acute 
violent conflicts were not intended to reduce 
conflicts. The power-sharing arrangement in 
Zanzibar (Tanzania) is an exception. In Zanzibar, 
a referendum on the matter of constitutional 
amendments was conducted in July 2010 and was 
supported by approximately two-thirds of the 
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population. The aim of the referendum was to 
pre-empt violent clashes between the supporters 
of the two most important parties (Chama Cha 
Mapinduzi and Civic United Front) during the 
parliamentary and presidential elections. The 
amendment provided for the formation of a grand 
coalition in 2010 after the elections. This was 
implemented immediately and has resulted in the 
complete absence of any opposition.
Asia
Many recent conflicts in Asia have ended violently 
or are ongoing. This applies to Afghanistan, 
Myanmar (Burma) and Sri Lanka, as well as to 
conflicts confined to small areas of India. Even 
though conflicts in the Philippines were ended 
peacefully, in recent times, this has no longer been 
the case. Indonesia (Aceh) and Nepal provide 
interesting examples of how wars were ended 
with peace agreements.
Between 2005 and 2010, important constitutional 
amendments were made in the Asian countries of 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand.9 The new constitution 
for Thailand (2007) was strongly influenced by the 
military junta. Nevertheless, at least the rights of 
local communities have been strengthened (Articles 
66–67). Apparently this does not apply to Myanmar, 
which also received a new constitution under a 
harder regime (2008; Bünte 2008); the autonomy 
of ethnic minorities has received only vague gua-
rantees. In a top-down process, Bhutan gave itself a 
new constitution in 2008 containing elements of 
strong decentralization. However, the Lothshampas 
minority, which has partially been driven out of the 
country in the process, is not included, and stricter 
citizenship laws have been imposed. An important 
constitutional amendment in Pakistan (2010) has 
led to an increase of autonomy and a weakening 
of the president. Even though the constitutions of 
Malaysia and India undergo frequent amendments, 
a clear connection to ethnic-regional or religious 
conflicts has not been established.
Nepal constitutes the clearest example of 
all cases relevant to this text. The peace process 
and the associated constitutional process were 
long and have not yet been completed. The 
9 The Maldives are not included in the Minorities at Risk 
Project. The new constitution of 2008 creates the prerequisites 
for a multiparty democracy, but revokes citizenship for non-
Muslims. The omission of Nepal from the database is even 
more striking.
formal November 2006 peace agreement between 
Maoist rebels and civil parties happened against 
the background of the creation of an interim 
constitution which a) did not constitute Nepal as 
a Hindu monarchy and b) was to contain, among 
other things, an increase of participatory rights 
for ethnic minorities. Since then, Nepal has had 
an interim constitution with the following main 
elements: consensual government including all 
“seven parties” under a consensual prime minister 
(Articles 36–40); proportional participation of 
disadvantaged groups in state structures (Art-
icle 21); proportional representation of women, 
Dalits (untouchables, lowest caste, approx. 13% 
of the population), indigenous peoples and 
inhabitants of underdeveloped areas, Madhesi 
and other groups on the party lists for the election 
of the con stituent assembly (Article 63, 4); and the 
creation of local administrative bodies (Article 139). 
Nepal is to become a federal state. However, no 
clear specifications have been set forth (Article 138).
The constituent assembly, whose period of 
incumbency was extended twice, is responsible 
for the creation of a final republican constitution.
Latin America
In recent decades, Latin America, if the Colombian 
government’s fight (aided by right-wing militias) 
against left-wing guerrilla groups is exempt, has not 
seen any severely escalated civil wars.10 However, 
continued violent episodes due to real or perceived 
disadvantages for national minorities can indeed 
be observed in this region. It seems questionable 
whether they are still the cause for violence in 
Colombia, where indigenous peoples constitute 
only 3% of the total population. Important 
constitutional amendments during the examined 
period occurred only in the following states with 
“divided societies”: Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, 
where once again one of the overriding motives for 
constitutional amendment was the safeguarding 
of executive leadership (for example, in Colombia 
and Venezuela) (Nolte/Horn 2009).
The inclusion of collective rights for ethnic 
groups (in particular indigenous groups, popu-
lation groups with an African background) in 
some constitutions stems from the recognition of 
10 Connections between constitutional amendments and peace 
treaties can be established for Colombia and Guatemala in 
the early 1990s.
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these rights in international human rights and is 
not a result of peace agreements. This also applies 
to recent constitutional amendments in Ecuador 
and Bolivia. They occurred in the wake of broad 
social protest, not after a country-wide escalation 
of violence. In both states, the main delineation 
of conflict runs between the economically and 
culturally disadvantaged predominantly rural in-
digenas and the urban population, which occupies 
a higher social position. A fixed amount of seats 
in parliament (Bolivia) or in congress (Venezuela, 
Colombia) and the recognition of legal pluralism 
aim to defuse these conflicts. In Bolivia, quota 
regulations going beyond this were decreed.
Middle East/North Africa (MENA Region)
Superficially, only few states in the MENA region 
appear to be ethnically diverse (Afghanistan, Iran 
and, in particular, Iraq). Nevertheless, significant 
national minorities live in some states (Syria: 
Kurds; Algeria/Morocco: Berbers; etc.), and there 
are several societies with religious conflict lines 
between Sunnites and Shiites (for example, Bah-
rain and Yemen – the latter not being included 
in the Minorities at Risk database), between 
Christian groups (Lebanon), or – as is the case in 
Egypt – between Copts and Muslims. In addition 
to ongoing violent conflicts (Israel/Palestine) and 
completely new violent conflicts in North Africa 
and the Arab Peninsula, which have not yet been 
subject to much academic examination, one state 
has been particularly prominent in the period from 
2005–2010: Iraq, where important ceasefires and 
constitutional amendments have been achieved.
The new Iraqi constitution was accepted in 
2005. Contrary to the demands of the Sunnites, 
the primary result was federalism with few 
large regions and few integrated mechanisms 
of inter-ethnical or inter-religious cooperation. 
However, the introduction of 18 provinces met 
Sunnite interests. Rights of political say as to 
the distribution of oil resources and a relatively 
strongly defined principle of subsidiarity to the 
benefit of these regions and Kurdistan in particular 
(Article 111 et seq.) come close to some ideals of 
the consociational principle – others, however, to 
a lesser extent. A provision for a second chamber 
to represent minority rights (Article 62) was 
made, and the interim provisions determined 
a presidential council (a Kurd, a Sunnite and a 
Shiite) for reaching unanimous decisions. In 2009 
this led to the conclusion on the part of vice-
president al-Hashemi that he could veto the new 
electoral law (he was shown that he was wrong 
by the Constitutional Court). Many regulatory 
provisions are lacking. Particularist parties won 
the first elections, but in the 2010 elections – after 
ending violent conflicts with several militias – 
“centralists” took the lead (Fürtig 2010). This 
can be interpreted as an indication that the 
constitution and the electoral laws are, after all, 
rather flexible. However, the subsequent formation 
of a government was strongly characterized by an 
agreement between the ethnic-religious blocks. 
In March 2008 an offensive of government troops 
unilaterally ended the preliminary 2007/2008 
ceasefire with the Al-Mahdi army. Thus, the 
constitutional process and peace initiatives do 
not appear to have been strongly linked, but 
the introduction of the constitution, which was 
created with significant U.S. participation, led to 
a substantial alleviation of tension.
The constitutional amendment in Algeria (2008) 
was created quickly, and one of its key points 
was its allowance of a third presidential term for 
President Bouteflika, a change met with criticism, 
particularly on the part of Berber politicians. 
Between 2005 and 2007, Egypt’s President Mubarak 
ordered substantial amendments to the Egyptian 
constitution and their subsequent approval per 
referendum. The central amendments were an 
opening to capitalism, while only few civil liberty 
reforms were considered in the text. The revolution 
of January 2011 led to a modification of the 
constitution, which was accepted in a referendum 
on 19 March 2011. The majority of Copts (a 
religious minority) voted against the constitution, 
as it did not abolish Article 2, pursuant to which 
Egypt is defined as an Islamic country.
Peculiarities and Open Questions
The application of strict criteria and the examina-
tion of a relatively short period (cf. Table 1) show 
that there is apparently only a weak link between 
constitutional amendments and peace agreements 
in “divided societies”. However, it should be 
noted that processes of constitutional amendment 
as well as peace processes are frequently designed 
for a longer period and occasionally develop 
mutual “long-term effects”.
Apparently, there is a broad diversity of consti-
tutional reforms ranging from the com prehensive 
design of new constitutions (some with consociatio-
nal intentions, see Burundi), in terim constitutions 
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(some with many strong consociational elements, 
see Nepal, Sudan) and more or less profound re-
forms of individual paragraphs.
In more recent reforms, the strengthening of de-
centralizing elements seems to be the most obvious 
of the measures intended to implement peace 
policies; doing so also strengthens group autonomy. 
Grand coalitions also feature prominently in interim 
constitutions (Iraq, Nepal, Sudan). In contrast, 
proportionality regulations are rarely codified, 
and veto rights are formulated as a consensual 
method to make decisions, which sometimes seems 
questionable (see Iraq, DR Congo).
It should be noted that many constitutional 
amendments in “divided societies” are not directly 
conceptualized to reduce conflict. Constitutional 
amendments aiming to extend or reduce presi dential 
powers are particularly relevant. Like, for example, 
in Cameroon, Niger and Venezuela, regulations can 
exacerbate such conflicts without causing a civil war.
Apparently, processual factors strongly con-
tribute to the failure of implementing customized 
constitutions to defuse conflicts in “divided socie-
ties”. In addition to the lack of consideration for 
alternatives and the weight of historical insights, 
the interests of the main conflict parties and the 
fear for their own security mainly prevent optimal 
constitutional engineering. However, it cannot be 
ruled out that actors learn from experience – 
amendments can also be made after the adoption 
of a(n) (interim) constitution! 
It was not the purpose of this analysis to examine 
how, in reality, mechanisms of constitutional law 
function for the handling of causes of conflict. A 
closer look, however, may prove rewarding. The 
clear finding that constitutional amendments, at 
least recently, have rarely been used to reduce 
conflict is surprising.
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Table 1: Important constitutional amendments/
important peace agreements in “divided 
societies“ (2005–2010)
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